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Everywhere around the world
They're coming to America ...
Got a dream to take them there
They're coming to America...
Today, Today, Today
I. INTRODUCTION
The reputation of forum non conveniens is at stake. Briefly
stated, the doctrine stands for one court dismissing a matter
because another court is viewed as the more convenient forum.
But why should this doctrine draw such criticism and challenge to
its very existence? 2 Lack of a challenge might be expected when
discussing two alternative courts in the same nation applying
essentially the same law, but when the two courts are in two dif-
ferent nations, the consequences of determining the more conve-
nient forum are often far more significant. Two recent challenges
to the doctrine, from different continents and different legal tradi-
tions, have both caused foreign courts and legislatures to argue
that forum non conveniens-based dismissal requests in U.S.
courts must be rejected, and led the European Court of Justice to
abolish the use of the doctrine altogether. The first challenge
comes from several nations in Latin America, although it does not
include the larger, more developed Latin American nations of
Argentina, Brazil, Chile or Mexico.' The second challenge comes
from the European Court of Justice in the form of a decision deny-
ing U.K. courts the use of forum non conveniens in international
litigation.4 This article will address the first challenge in depth,
1. NEIL DIAMoND, America, in THE JAZZ SINGER (EMI Films Ltd. 1980).
2. See, e.g., Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens
Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309 (2002); David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in
America and England: "A Rather Fantastic Fiction," 103 L. Q. REV. 398 (1987). The
origins of the doctrine are uncertain, but it appears to have roots in Scottish law and
its restatement in 1978 in the case of MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd., [1978]
A.C. 795 (H.L.) (appeal taken from A.C.); see also J.G. COLLIER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 78-
92 (1987); Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L.
REV. 380, 386-89 (1947).
3. The countries that have participated in the challenge by adopting specific
legislation purportedly nullifying forum non conveniens use in the United States
include Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama. There
have been decisions in other nations, including Mexico, that have addressed forum
non conveniens by interpretations of rules of civil procedure that grant a plaintiff a
choice of filing at the location of the injury or the domicile of the defendant. See, e.g.,
Inter-American Bar Association, Law Links, Forum Non Conveniens, Mexico, http://
www.iaba.org/LLinks forum_nonMexico.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
4. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. 1-1383.
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but only briefly describe the second challenge from the European
Union. This is not because the second is less deserving of discus-
sion-indeed it has very significant implications not only within
the European Union, but also for international relations involving
any EU nation. The focus is on the first challenge because these
comments are principally in response to an article that appeared
in this law review in 2004.1 That article was presented at a sym-
posium on forum non conveniens at which Henry Saint Dahl and
Alejandro Garro,6 both long-respected Latin American-focused
scholars, advocated, for different reasons, the challenge brought
against forum non conveniens.7 Their articles were followed by
comments by Professor Bernard Oxman, also a long-respected
scholar, more generally known for public international law than
Latin American scholarship. s Oxman's brief response rejected the
ideas that a court is compelled by any principles of international
law to honor the choice of forum by a plaintiff and that such selec-
tion extinguishes jurisdiction in other courts.' These comments
more directly challenge the positions promoted by Dahl than did
Oxman's comments. 10
5. Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking
Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21 (2003). Dahl is a practitioner based in
Virginia and has consulted on forum non conveniens cases. He serves as Adjunct
Secretary General of the Inter-American Bar Association. See Inter-American Bar
Association (IABA) Officers, http://www.iaba.org/english_%20home%20page.htm (last
visited Dec. 18, 2006).
6. Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: "Availability" and "Adequacy" of
Latin America Fora from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
65 (2003). Garro is Senior Research Scholar and Adjunct Professor at the Columbia
University School of Law and has appeared often as an expert on various Latin
American nations' laws, including representing foreign plaintiffs facing forum non
conveniens-based motions to dismiss in U.S. courts. See Full Time Faculty of
Columbia Law School, http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/fulltimefac?&main
.find=G (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
7. See Dahl, supra note 5; Garro, supra note 6.
8. Bernard H. Oxman, Comments on Forum Non Conveniens Issues in
International Cases, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 123 (2003). Oxman is Professor
of Law at the University of Miami School of Law. He is one of the nation's most
distinguished authorities on the law of the sea and served for many years as Assistant
Legal Advisor to the Department of State. See University of Miami School of Law,
http://www.law.miami.edu/facadmin/faculty/bhoxman.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2006).
9. See Oxman, supra note 8, at 123.
10. Professor Gordon has also consulted and acted as an expert on many forum
non conveniens cases, both for plaintiffs and defendants, but principally for such
defendants as BASF (Ecuador), Ciba-Geigy (Ecuador), Dupont (Costa Rica), Scott
Paper (Panama), B.C.S. (Italy), Sandals (Cuba), SuperClubs (Cuba), etc.
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II. THE CHALLENGE FROM SOME NATIONS IN LATIN
AMERICA: THE ADOPTION OF FOREIGN FORUM
SHOPPING SUPPORT LAWS
One current challenge from Latin America seems surprisingly
like a renewal of the North-South dialogue of the 1970s, when
developing nations, justifiably frustrated by their poverty,
thought not to blame their own often corrupt and inept leaders
and policies, but to instead demand a transfer of resources from
developed nations." This "we are poor because you are rich" argu-
ment faded as some of these nations tried another path to eco-
nomic prosperity by driving a greenback-covered cross of
capitalism into the heart of the dialogue 2 and by forming mean-
ingful trade alliances.13 These nations began to understand that
economic development in Asia was not attributable to restrictive
rules on the transfer of technology and foreign investment, but to
a climate encouraging such transfers of technology and capital.
When Eastern Europe broke from the bonds imposed by the
U.S.S.R., investors who might have considered Latin America
began to flock to Eastern Europe, and the restrictive rules of the
1970s in Latin America were largely discarded. 4 More recently,
and not inconsistent with the movement to nullify forum non con-
veniens, is the return to nationalism and restrictive rules, most
11. See, e.g., FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1979); GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF
LIBERATION (Sister Caridad Ina and John Eagleson trans. and eds. 1973); EDUARDO
GALEANO, LAS VENAS ABIERTAS DE AMERICA LATINA [OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA]
(1971).
12. See generally, PLINIO APULEYO MENDOZA, CARLOS ALBERTO MONTANER &
ALVARO VARGAS LLOSA, GUIDE TO THE PERFECT LATIN AMERICAN IDIOT (Michaela
Lajda Amens trans. 2000); HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
13. For example, Mexico sought the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) after President Carlos Salinas de Gortari visited Eastern Europe after the
wall tumbled and the tide of investment began to flood in. He wanted a share of that
investment brought to Mexico. See, e.g., RALPH H. FOLSOM, NAFTA AND FREE TRADE
IN THE AMERICAS 67 (2d ed. 2004).
14. For example, Mexico joined the GATT and abolished its restrictive 1972 Law
on the Transfer of Technology, the 1973 Law on Investment and the 1976 Inventions
and Tradenames Law, then continued the trend by participating in NAFTA. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN ZAMORA, JosP RAMON Cossfo, LEONEL PEREZNIETO CASTRO, Josg ROLDAN-
XOPA & DAVID LOPEZ, MEXICAN LAW 92 (2004); IGNACIO GOMEz-PALACIO, DERECHO DE
LOS NEGOCIOS INTERNACIONALES [INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW] (2006); IGNACIO
GOMEZ-PALACIO Y ZAMORA GUTIIRREZ, INVERSION EXTRANJERA DIRECTA [DIRECT
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS] (1985); Michael W. Gordon, Of Aspirations and Operations:
The Governance of Multinational Enterprises by Third World Nations, 16 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 301 (1984).
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notably in Venezuela and Bolivia. 15 However, rumblings of discon-
tent are heard in other nations such as Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru
and even Chile and Costa Rica. 16 This less explains the movement
to nullify forum non conveniens than it illustrates one manifesta-
tion of many Latin Americans' discontent with their own nations'
failures to provide better economic opportunities and fair and
competent governance.
The "road from serfdom"'" for these nations is not easy, and
now foreigners, many from the most dependent nations of Latin
America, are flocking to U.S. courts, choosing locations such as
South Texas, where juries are thought to be sympathetic to plain-
tiffs." This influx of cases led one U.S. federal district court judge
in Texas to comment, "[wihy none of these countries seems to have
a court system their own governments have confidence in is a
mystery to this Court." 9 It shouldn't be a mystery why foreign
plaintiffs choose the United States as a forum; it is a combination
of court systems in which their own nationals have reason not to
have confidence combined with the perceived riches of a U.S. judg-
ment akin in magnitude to their own national lotteries. Neil Dia-
mond's lyrics "They're coming to America," 0 perhaps more
poetically phrased by Lord Denning's famous words, "[als a moth
15. President Hugo Chavez, elected in 1998 and again in 2002, has aligned himself
and Venezuela with Cuba, and assumed a leadership role in South America in
opposing free trade and restricting foreign investments, including nationalizing oil
production and distribution. In Bolivia, Evo Morales was elected on a platform
consistent with Venezuela's, including nationalizing gas production. See, e.g., United
States State Department, Country Reports of Venezuela and Boliiva, http://www
.state.gov/r/pa/eilbgn (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
16. Ecuador may follow Venezuela and Bolivia with nationalizations and
restrictive trade policies if the Chavez disciple wins a run-off election in November,
2006. Nicaragua's Sandanista rebel Daniel Ortega could become the country's next
president; his supporters want Nicaragua out of the fledgling CAFTA. Peru, troubled
by government corruption, faces an uncertain immediate future. Costa Rica has
refused to lessen its government control over several major industries, including
electricity and telecommunications. Chile, usually viewed as the nation in South
America most receptive to trade and investment, could see that view moderated with
changes in the presidency. See generally, N.Y. TIMES, WALL ST. J., ECONOMIST
(providing information about current political events in these nations).
17. See FRIEDERICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). The return trip from
the road described in Hayek's famous book is harder than the outward journey.
18. See Republic of Bol. v. Philip Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009 (S.D.
Texas 1999) ("[Gliven the tremendous number of United States jurisdictions
emcompassing fascinating and exotic places, the Court can hardly imagine why the
Republic of Bolivia elected to file suit in the veritable hinterlands of Brazoria County,
[South] Texas.").
19. Id.
20. Diamond, supra note 1.
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is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States."'"
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, once an obscure theory
evolving in the halcyon highlands of single malt, haggis and Shel-
ties," is now viewed as a final bastion to new sources of easy
money. That the doctrine has been used successfully and fre-
quently to dismiss actions in the United States brought by forum
shopping foreigners against U.S. multinational corporations con-
firms the smoldering suspicions that some life is left in the North-
South rhetoric that perceives these foreign multinationals to be
the core of the evil empire.
The creative fiction evolving from a few nations in Latin
America concentrates on one narrow, but essential, element of
forum non conveniens theory: "dismissal would not be appropriate
where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the sub-
ject matter of the dispute," as expressed in the most important
U.S. Supreme Court decision on forum non conveniens.23 Perhaps,
thought these creative minds, we could make our own courts
unavailable to our own folks who will then go off forum shopping
to the United States, not to the great malls to bring back Patago-
nia outer and Victoria's Secret inner garments, but to bring back
dollars, far more valuable than pesos or reales or escudos, or
whatever some recently departed ministers of finance have con-
verted their nation's devalued currencies. And thus our fable
begins.
III. THE ARGUMENTS OF HENRY SAINT DAHL
Henry Saint Dahl's illuminating article in this Law Review
described the efforts of a few Latin American nations to abolish
the U.S. use of forum non conveniens.2 Dahl's title aptly denotes
21. Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch (1983) 1 W.L.R. 730, 733 (A.C.).
22. See COLLIER, supra note 2, at 78-92. The doctrine of forum non conveniens was
not a strong part of English law until the 1970s, partly because English courts tended
to welcome forum shopping. The forum shoppers were not choosing English courts to
obtain large judgments against English defendants, but rather were foreign plaintiffs
and foreign defendants choosing English courts because of their reputation for
fairness.
23. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981). The meaning of
availability within the discussion of an alternative forum related to whether the
defendant "was amenable to process" in the other nation, not whether the plaintiff
was so amenable unless he voluntarily chose to close offjurisdiction (quoting Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947)).
24. See Dahl, supra note 5. To dispute Henry Dahl is a formidable challenge,
much because he has been a valued friend for some three decades. But the best of
friends occasionally step off the deep end. One function of a friend is to pull friends
out when they are treading water. So I proceed.
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that this movement is not a contribution to long-smoldering
debates over the viability of forum non conveniens," but is more
recent in origin, perhaps better labeled a Latin American seven-
year itch.26 Dahl's comments are beguiling because they seem sur-
prisingly inconsistent with the current state of forum non con-
veniens theory.27 The theory of forum non conveniens did not lead
to blocking statutes. Dahl's concern lies not in cases retained in
the United States where courts seek evidence-gathering assis-
25. The debates are more directed to the characteristics of forum non conveniens,
such as greater deference to domestic rather than foreign plaintiffs, meaning of an
adequate alternative forum, scope of the private and public factor analysis, and
conditions imposed upon the grant of the motion to dismiss, such as not challenging
jurisdiction or raising the statute of limitations, than to the abolition of the doctrine
itself that is sought by the movement.
26. Dahl's article was presented as part of a symposium titled "Forum Non
Conveniens: Development and Issues over the Past Seven Years" and published in the
Inter-American Law Review Symposium Edition. See Symposium, Forum Non
Conveniens: Development and Issues Over the Past Seven Years, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 21 (2003). Dahl's title, Forum Non Conveniens: Latin America and
Blocking Statutes, is confusing because the use of the phrase "blocking statutes" more
aptly refers to a series of statutes adopted in many nations requiring their courts to
limit or withhold assistance to U.S. courts that are perceived to be exerting
extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond the authority permitted in international law. See,
e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 § 1, (Eng.); Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order SOR/1992-584 (Can.); Business
Records Protection Act, R.S.O., ch. B 19, §§ 1, 2 (1990) (Can.); see also GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY &
MATERIALS 847 (3d ed. 1996). Blocking laws were adopted initially to address
antitrust actions brought in the United States against foreign defendants that might
result in large treble damages awards, which depended upon access to evidence
located abroad and thus required foreign assistance in providing that access. Foreign
blocking statutes were adopted to deny U.S. requests for access to extensive evidence
in the foreign nation for use in a U.S. proceeding. The Latin American statutes Dahl
mislabels as blocking statutes do not block any action of a U.S. court that intrudes
upon the territory of the foreign nation. Forum non conveniens is used to dismiss the
case in the United States; it is not a transfer order to move the case to the foreign
nation, an act clearly beyond the authority of any U.S. court. It merely determines
that in the view of the U.S. court there is a better place for the suit if the plaintiff
wishes to proceed. It is not a doctrine of compulsion that demands the initiation of
claims abroad, which would justify Dahl's concern. Dahl suggests that these new
Latin American statutes affect a proceeding in the United States, much like
traditional blocking statutes. But the fact is that in the traditional cases where
blocking laws are used the U.S. judicial proceeding continues with or without the
requested assistance in obtaining foreign evidence from abroad, while in the cases
discussed by Dahl the U.S. court proceeding is dismissed with no request, much less a
demand, made to the foreign court to assert jurisdiction.
27. This is a theory of U.S. law, developed from English and Scottish law. It did
not develop on the slopes of Macchu Picchu or the heights of Tikal. One may only
hope that Dahl renders to Caesar that which is Caesar's, and has as much respect for
forum non conveniens as he assumes exists in the United States for the provoking
notions of the eminent Cuban jurist Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.
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tance from abroad, but rather cases that are dismissed in the
United States because there is a more proper forum abroad. The
term "blocking statutes" has developed its own sphere of meaning
and debate, exclusive from the debate over forum non conveniens.
To be fair, blocking statutes adopted by foreign nations evolved
from a foreign disdain for the tendency of U.S. legislators to assert
invasively the extraterritoriality of U.S. laws.28 Rather than refer-
ring to the new Latin American statutes designed to nullify forum
non conveniens as blocking statutes, which would give them a
credibility that they have not earned, they are more accurately
described as foreign forum shopping support statutes. The inten-
tion of these statutes is understandable; they assist their nation-
als in gaining access to U.S. courts that offer several benefits
absent to plaintiffs in their own nations-elements Dahl readily
admits are characteristics of a fair process and trial. 9 Those bene-
fits include retention of lawyers under contingent fee contracts,
rules that a losing plaintiff may avoid paying costs and fees no
matter how egregious the claim, jury trials, and most impor-
tantly, the often mythical pot of gold at the end of the rainbow,
punitive damages. The view seems no less encouraging than
when Robert Conway and his fellow travelers' plane crashed in
the Himalayas and, seeking a way out, they traversed a mountain
pass to view suddenly the utopian city of Shangri-La."
The irony of Dahl's article is that it nowhere suggests that it
might be possible and more advantageous in the long run for these
Latin American nations to amend their civil and procedural codes
to provide for these very same benefits they seek in the United
States. Many of these nations have very sophisticated and devel-
oped codes along with judicial institutions perfectly capable of
addressing the issues. 1 Nothing stands in the way of any of these
nations amending their legal system to move toward what a
28. An invasive apogee may have been achieved by the passage of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), 22
U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091, which attempted to convince, if not coerce, other nations to
restrain from trading with Cuba, regardless of those nations' perception (sometimes
referred to as the exercise of sovereignty) of the Cuban political system.
29. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 37-42.
30. See JAMES HILTON, LOST HORIZON (1934).
31. There are exceptions. Some systems are overwhelmed by corruption and
incompetency. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kalvin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (S.D. Fla.
1997), a federal district court refused to move a case to Bolivia on the grounds that it
was an inadequate system. See also infra note 149. That is a different issue from
availability, and one that requires U.S. courts to label foreign systems as unfair,
incompetent and sometimes corrupt, however justified. It is a classification courts
show a reluctance to verify in written decisions.
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nation's system should provide-fundamental fairness. It
remains one of the mysteries of comparative political theory why
so many legislatures are unable to pass legal reforms for the bene-
fit of their people, while they enact laws to assist litigation immi-
gration, the movement of their people to reap the benefits of
foreign laws their own legislatures seem incapable of adopting.
With such reforms, a judgment rendered with due process in any
of these foreign nations could be brought to U.S. courts for recog-
nition and enforcement.2 At most, Dahl suggests that suing at
home is "tantamount to abandoning the claim and losing the
case."33 That speaks volumes about Dahl's view of the capacity of
some Latin American legal systems to adjudicate any civil claims,
and the poor quality of legal representation in Latin America. It
is a view not fully shared by this author.
Dahl begins his comments with the statement that forum non
conveniens "causes highly illegal effects" in Latin America.34 To
disagree with a decision does not render the decision an illegal
act. 5 The principal effect of a successful forum non con-
veniens-based motion to dismiss is that the matter is no longer
before the U.S. court. The dismissal has no effect on the subse-
quent decision of the foreign plaintiff to initiate the action in his
own nation's court or a third nation's court.36  The dismissal
32. The United States has a history of enforcing judgments from a wide range of
nations, subject to their satisfying scrutiny as to proper jurisdiction, adequate notice,
and fairness or due process that is often discussed within the context of consistency
with U.S. public policy. A good example is Southwest Livestock and Trucking Co. v.
Ram6n, 169 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 1999), where the court enforced a Mexican judgment
enforcing a loan with an interest rate that would be unlawful for a loan in Texas. See
generally, CHARLES S. BALDWIN, IV, RONALD A. BRAND, DAVID EPSTEIN & MICHAEL
WALLACE GORDON, Ch. 6, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the
United States, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2004).
33. Dahl, supra note 5, at 26.
34. Id. at 21.
35. The United States has executed several foreign nationals who entered the
United States and committed murder. The foreign nation often argued that such
rulings in the United States violated U.S. and international law. But the foreign
nations did not argue that the executions caused illegal effects at home because they
were contrary to the foreign nation's law that prohibited capital punishment. See, e.g.,
Marcia Coyle, A Death Penalty Duel: U.N. Court Orders U.S. to Stay Executions,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 17, 2003, at A6; Leonard Post, Ruling in the Hague Undercuts Death
Case, NAT'L L.J., April 5, 2004, at A10.
36. The case might be initiated in a third nation. For example, when Ecuadorian
plaintiffs sued BASF of Germany and Ciba-Geigy of Switzerland, as well as Dupont,
in a U.S. court, after the U.S. court dismissed the action on forum non conveniens
grounds, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs might have sued BASF in a German court and
Ciba-Geigy in a Swiss court. See Ciba-Geigy Ltd., BASF A.G. v. Fish Peddler, Inc.,
691 So. 2d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Why they did not relates to the far more
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causes no illegal effect in Latin America because it does not order
the plaintiff to do anything, nor does the dismissal foreclose the
request for enforcement in a U.S. court of any future judgment the
plaintiff might obtain in his own nation. Dahl's opening comment
is so contrary to legal theory in the United States, and I believe to
legal theory in most if not all of the advanced nations of the West,
that its full meaning deserves analysis. As a matter of comity, the
United States would be concerned if its courts were causing highly
illegal effects in other nations, but causing highly stressful disap-
pointments is not the same as causing highly illegal effects.
Dahl believes the reaction to forum non conveniens in a few
Latin American nations who have enacted what he calls "blocking
statutes" is not really necessary, because matters "of illegality,
loss of evidence and impracticality remain, independently, from
the statutes."37 He further suggests that the Latin American
movement in any event "does not in any way contravene or antag-
onize US [sic] law."" Assuming the latter to be true, U.S. courts
may simply ignore these laws as inapplicable in forum non con-
veniens analysis and continue to determine whether the foreign
plaintiff could have chosen to initiate first the suit at home rather
than in the United States.39 That may indeed become a singularly
attractive features of U.S. courts. German and Swiss laws do not allow punitive
damages, jury trials or contingent fee contracts. Civil law tradition nations, including
Germany and Switzerland, limit damages to what is specifically provided for in the
civil code. Punitive damages, and in many nations, pain and suffering, are not
included. Cases involve a lengthy process of filings and hearings before a judge, at
the end of which the judge decides the case. There is no trial as is known in common
law nations where a jury is used. Lawyers are usually paid at a fixed rate per item, or
on an hourly basis. Sharing a percentage in the outcome is not recognized throughout
the civil law traditions nations. There are some deviations to these general
conclusions, such as Spain's repeal of its civil procedure code and adoption of a trial
process similar to that in common law nations. See Santiago Nadal & Salvatore De
Traglia, What You Always Wanted and Need to Know About the Legal Environment of
Spain, 67 DEF. COUNSEL J. 318 (2000); see also Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-
Law Litigation Systems and American Cooperation with those Systems, 45 U. KAN. L.
REV. 9 (1996); MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL W. GORDON & PAOLO G. CARozzA,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1999). To the Ecuadorian
plaintiffs it was "all or nothing," only the United States being the "all." Dahl rejects
this decision. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 44 n.93. This author was a consultant and
expert for BASF and Ciba-Geigy in both the initial decision and the refiling in Miami
after dismissal in Ecuador.
37. Dahl, supra note 5, at 21.
38. Id.
39. If the plaintiff could have initiated the suit at home, the availability analysis
would be complete; it would have satisfied the Piper mandate that the defendant be
"amenable to process" in the foreign nation. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
255 n.22 (1981).
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important question and one that quickly ends many cases brought
in the United States as a result of these foreign forum shopping
support laws. But before Dahl's suppositions are further dis-
cussed, it is appropriate to address his sixteen reasons why forum
non conveniens, as applied in U.S. courts, causes "highly illegal
effects" in Latin America.4 ° In the opinion of this author, not one
of the sixteen is persuasive. Several are redundant.
A. Plaintiff Forced to File a Claim
41
Dahl first argues that the foreign plaintiff dismissed in the
U.S. court is "forced to file a claim" back home." This choice of
words is intemperate, suggesting the U.S. action has interfered
with the foreigner's exercise of his "own free and spontaneous
will" and that the plaintiff is "compelled" and "coerced" by the
forum non conveniens dismissal to take action contrary to his own
perceived self-interests.43 For support of his compulsion theory
Dahl first cites a resolution of the Honduran Congress that itself
provides no authority supporting the notion that any U.S. court
has ever compelled the dismissed plaintiff to initiate a suit in his
own nation. 4 For support of his coercion theory Dahl cites a Phil-
ippines lower court decision that misunderstands the U.S. court
order.45 The U.S. court in the case, that was dismissed prior to
filing in the Philippines, did not issue any order to the plaintiff to
40. Dahl, supra note 5, at 21, 25-27.
41. See id. at 25.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 25 n.17. The fact that there is an alternative forum available and
adequate in another nation does not constitute a judicial order to proceed in that
nation. Dahl never cites one U.S. case that includes an order to proceed and file suit
in a foreign court. Admittedly, the language of some decisions assumes that the
plaintiff will return home to file suit because the U.S. court has not suggested that the
suit is without merit. Dahl's use of the term "blocking law" may be to analogize a
forum non conveniens-based dismissal with a U.S. court order to a party to produce
documents held abroad, which may conflict with a blocking law. The U.S. court has
ordered a party over whom it believes it has jurisdiction to produce a document that
may also be under the jurisdiction of a foreign nation. That creates a conflict, but it is
an order to produce something the U.S. court believes it needs and has jurisdiction
over. The forum non conveniens based dismissal produces no such extraterritorial
effect. The U.S. court has dismissed the case and has no interest whether the plaintiff
returns home to initiate the action, goes to another third nation to initiate the action,
seeks a settlement, or decides not to further pursue the matter for any of many
reasons.
45. See id. at 25 n.18; see also Inter-American Bar Association, Law Links, Forum
Non Conveniens, Philippines, http://www.iaba.org/LLinksforum-non-Philippines
.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006) (discussing Nacida).
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file anywhere.46 The Philippines court seemed to require an order
from a Philippines court that said courts were not available before
it could properly return the case to the U.S. court. Consequently,
the Philippines court held that the four step process of (1) filing in
the United States, (2) being dismissed because there is an alterna-
tive forum in the Philippines, (3) filing in the Philippines court
and getting the order, and (4) refiling in the U.S. court is somehow
coercive. The problem with Dahl's argument is that the U.S. court
does nothing more than determine, to the best of its ability, that it
is not the more appropriate court for the matter, although it may
have jurisdiction. The U.S. court has no interest in what occurs
after the dismissal. The matter may end there because the plain-
tiff takes no further steps. The matter may be settled. The mat-
ter may be initiated in an alternative forum, almost certainly the
court in the plaintiffs nation, with the intention to seek a judg-
ment against the defendant. Or, as promoted by Dahl, the matter
may be initiated in the foreign court by the plaintiff who immedi-
ately moves for dismissal of his own case on the grounds that he
has made his nation's forum unavailable and wants to try again in
the U.S. court.47 The plaintiffs court may have been available, but
he was unwilling to use it. Dahl's article is essentially about how
some Latin American nations have been trying to assist their
nationals' efforts to sue in the United States by making the local
courts available in all circumstances except when the plaintiff does
not want it to be available.
I agree with Dahl's reference to acto personalismo, acts
"where the free will of the person is so important that they cannot
be forced upon anybody."4 s No U.S. judge has the authority to
order a foreign party to file a claim in the party's domestic court.
Dahl cites no U.S. case where such an order has been given. Simi-
larly, no foreign judge has the authority to order a U.S. court to
allow a foreign national to pursue an action in the U.S. court that
is contrary to the rules of law of the U.S. court. Acto personalismo
is not a rule of international law, and if it exists as a rule of law of
a particular nation it cannot be extended by that nation extrater-
ritorially to mandate acts in another nation. Even if it carries
domestic constitutional authority, Dahl's conclusion that foreign
46. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
47. The plaintiff is not seeking a judgment against the defendant, but a judgment
against himself. The defendant is an unnecessary party because the plaintiff files the
complaint and immediately moves to dismiss the complaint.
48. Dahl, supra note 5, at 25 n.22.
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courts (like that of the Philippines) may grant rights within the
United States must be rejected.49
B. Plaintiff Deprived from Right to Sue in
Defendant's Court0
Part of Dahl's compulsion/coercion theory seems based on his
second argument, that the foreign plaintiff has some absolute
right to have his matter heard in a U.S. court."' The source of that
right, according to Dahl, is Roman law, as it has developed to be
part of the Bustamante Code.52 Dahl is admitted to practice in
several jurisdictions in the United States, but his academic train-
ing is from several foreign countries. 3 He was apparently well
indoctrinated in the force of the civil law's extraterritorial applica-
tion to imply even that U.S. courts might be subject to the Busta-
mante Code. The provision of that Code at issue suggests that a
proper location of jurisdiction is the domicile of the defendant. 4
But the Bustamante Code was never intended to impose jurisdic-
tion upon a foreign nation's courts.55 The place of the defendant's
49. See id. at 26 n.23.
50. See id. at 26.
51. See id. at 26-27.
52. See id. at 26. The Common Law tradition, within which the doctrine of forum
non conveniens developed, does not trace its legal rules to Roman law. Nor do either
Common Law tradition nations or the vast majority of Civil Law tradition nations
trace their legal rules to Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante. A Cuban jurist,
Bustamante's name was given to the private international law product of the Sixth
International Conference of American States in 1928. Parts of the code have been
adopted in a significant number of Latin American nations. But it was rejected by
Mexico, and never seriously considered by the United States or Canada. Since Dahl is
attempting to influence U.S. law, he would be more effective without placing his
principal source of authority on a jurist unknown in the United States and most of the
world, however venerated he may deservedly be in a few nations of this hemisphere.
See Code of Private International Law. Annexed to the Convention adopted at
Habana, February 20, 1928 ("Bustamante Code"), in IV INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
2283 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., Carengie Endowment for International Peace 1932)
[hereinafter Bustamante Code); see also Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Pan-American Code
of Private International Law, 4 TUL. L. REV. 499 (1930).
53. Henry Saint Dahl, Boudreau & Dahl, PC, JD (Buenos Aires), LLM (London),
Stazhor (Leningrad), LLD (Buenos Aires), admitted in Washington, DC, Texas, New
York, Madrid (Spain) and Buenos Aires (Argentina). Special Counsel to Jones,
Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carre & Denegre L.L.P. Law Professor at the
Conservatoire National des Artes et Metiers, Paris, France. See Dahl, supra note 5,
at 21 n.1.
54. See Bustamante Code.
55. Article 314 of the Bustamante Code states that "[tihe law of each contracting
State determines the competence of courts, as well as their organization, the forms of
procedure and of execution of judgments, and the appeals from their decisions." See
id. at 2325.
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domicile is the most likely place to obtain personal jurisdiction."
But it is not an exclusive location for jurisdiction. The Busta-
mante Code itself also provides for jurisdiction at the place of the
act causing the injury.57 The injuries that Dahl speaks of have
occurred in the various Latin American nations. To this author's
knowledge, none of the nations that have adopted the Bustamante
Code have adopted only that part of the Code that provides for
jurisdiction in the defendant's domicile.58 Contrary to Dahl's
statement, forum non conveniens does not deprive the plaintiff
from "the right to sue in the defendant's domicile."59 A foreign
plaintiff may have a legal right to file the suit in the United
States, but that right does not arise from the law of the plaintiffs
nation or from the Bustamante Code. It arises exclusively from
U.S. law. Were the United States a participant to a treaty with a
Latin American nation where the treaty includes a foreign forum
shopping support provision, then the right would indeed arise as
56. Dahl does not address the fact that in many of the cases brought in the United
States the defendant is a U.S. parent of a foreign subsidiary that is a separate legal
entity domiciled in the plaintiffs nation. Such a case may be dismissed as to the
parent because it was the acts of the foreign subsidiary that are at issue and be
dismissed against the subsidiary for lack of personal jurisdiction. The question of
liability of a parent for acts of its subsidiaries involves the doctrine of veil piercing, a
complex exercise in determining whether the parent has created or used the
subsidiary for illegal or fraudulent purposes or for other misconduct. "Other
misconduct" has never been very satisfactorily defined.
57. That location is nearly always in the plaintiffs nation, where the plaintiff was
allegedly injured. But there are exceptions, such as where the products are
negligently made in the United States and distributed abroad. See Bustamante Code
at 2326 (Art. 323 states "[o]utside the cases of express or implied submissions,
without prejudice to local laws to the contrary, the judge competent for hearing
personal causes shall be the one of the place where the obligation is to be performed,
and in the absence thereof the one of the domicile or nationality of the defendants and
subsidiarily that of their residence."). Article 168 specifically addresses those
obligations that are extracontractual, or as known in the United States, tort. It
states, "Itihose [obligations] arising from actions or omissions involving guilt or
negligence not punishable by law shall be governed by the law of the place in which
the negligence or guilt giving rise to them was incurred." Id. at 2307. In such case,
the manufacturing might be a problem as well as any negligent way in which the
product was used by the plaintiff in the foreign nation.
58. It would not make sense to omit the alternative where the injury occurred
because it would severely restrict jurisdiction. Dahl notes that the Code has been
adopted by Central American nations (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama), Caribbean nations (Cuba, the Dominican
Republic and Haiti), and South American nations (Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and
Brazil). See Dahl, supra note 5, at 26 n.25. But he does not make it clear when he
discusses Article 323 of the Code that it is neither the exclusive rule of jurisdiction for
torts under the Bustamante Code, nor under the jurisdiction rules of most civil law
nations.
59. Dahl, supra note 5, at 47.
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an obligation of U.S. law. Dahl, however, argues that the plain-
tiffs have the absolute right not only to file in the United States,
but to proceed to trial in the U.S. court. The U.S. doctrine of
forum non conveniens, nevertheless, is a U.S. legal doctrine that
conditions plaintiffs proceeding to trial in the chosen court on, in
the view of the U.S. court, it being the proper forum.6 ° Would
Dahl also argue that the foreign plaintiffs have a right to have
U.S. substantive law, including the law of damages, applied in the
U.S. court? After all, U.S. courts have always had to choose the
proper law, and it is often in tort cases that the proper law is
where the injury occurred, which would be the foreign law.61 Dahl
does not seem to object to a U.S. court retaining the matter and
applying the law of the plaintiffs nation. Indeed, Dahl is so criti-
cal of the ability of these Latin American nations to render justice
in these cases that he must believe that U.S. courts are better able
to apply the foreign law than are the plaintiffs own courts.62
I agree with Dahl's implied premise that every Latin Ameri-
can nation has the right to develop their own rules of jurisdiction
for their own courts, which could extend a clear and absolute pro-
hibition of any suit being brought in their own nation based on a
tort occurring in their nation. That would create an interesting
question for U.S. courts: would forum non conveniens be applied
when the foreign forum was clearly unavailable to all persons in
all instances, whether the torts were caused by local or foreign
corporations? If both the plaintiff and the defendant corporations
were nationals of that foreign nation, a U.S. court would not
accept the case. 63 There would be no subject matter jurisdiction
and probably no personal jurisdiction over the defendant. If the
defendant was a U.S. corporation and personal jurisdiction
appeared to exist, the court might apply forum non conveniens in
more strict clothing. The court might alter the availability
requirement to mean that even though the foreign nation may not
have jurisdiction, it could have jurisdiction if its legislators so
60. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 291 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
61. If the forum shopping support statute movement is successful, a U.S. court
required to retain a case brought by a foreign plaintiff, who the court believes has
little connection to the United States, may be more inclined to dismiss on
jurisdictional grounds and certainly be more likely to apply foreign law.
62. It does seem that a necessary extension of the foreign forum shopping support
laws would be to demand access not only to U.S. courts, but the application of U.S.
law. Otherwise the golden dream of punitive damages fades quickly.
63. To do so would make the United States a kind of world forum for civil trials,
parallel to a center for arbitration where there are no links to the parties to the
dispute.
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decided and the United States was not prepared to become the
surrogate court for nations intentionally deciding to deny their
nationals a domestic forum. This indeed underlies the negative




Dahl again supposes that Latin American rules may be a
source of law in the United States, an error he made with respect
to the Bustamante Code.6 If Dahl is to be persuasive he ought to
apply U.S. rules of law. He debates an issue that the U.S.
Supreme Court has settled: whether a foreign plaintiffs choice of
a U.S. forum is to be given the same weight as a U.S. plaintiffs
choice of a U.S. forum. 7 Nearly every U.S. decision since Piper
has cited this part of the case as a binding rule. Until the U.S.
Supreme Court overrules this rule or it is modified by a treaty, it
remains, unaffected by the authorities that Dahl cites for support,
such as a legal opinion of the Attorney General of Ecuador and a
resolution of the Congress of Honduras .6  Dahl's analogy of grant-
ing less deference to a woman or black is inapt, as they are per-
sons clearly protected by U.S. law.69 The Piper case properly did
not attempt to address foreign constitutional protections that
Dahl misconstrues as having force in U.S. court proceedings.
D. Preemptive Jurisdiction"
Dahl uses pre-emptive jurisdiction to argue that once a U.S.
court has accepted jurisdiction, any jurisdiction in another nation
is preempted.7 But his argument applies only to notions of pre-
64. The courts are knowledgeable because in all but the consolidated cases
involving Venezuelan Ford/Bridgestone/Firestone accidents the U.S. courts were
reasonably well briefed on the distinction between availability and selective
unavailability to support forum shopping. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires
Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (regarding Venezuelan and
Colombian cases). But see Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D. Tex.
2004).
65. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 27.
66. See id. at 27-28. His authorities are rules in Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia. See
id. at 27 n.32. However, none of these nations has joined the Union, no matter how
frequently their nationals initiate suit in its courts.
67. See id. at 28 (discussing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56
(1987)).
68. See id. at 28 n.35.





emptive jurisdiction within those nations that have accepted such
rules. His theory is based in Roman law. 2 But Roman Law is not
the source of the common law, and his contemporary sources are
again exclusively Latin American, specifically Ecuadorian, Guate-
malan, Honduran, Nicaraguan, Panamanian and Peruvian. 73 But
separate from that concern is how these foreign forum shopping
statutes affect contemporary issues of concurrent jurisdiction.
The issue of forum non conveniens does not arise when there is
concurrent jurisdiction if cases have been filed in both possible
forums. If the cases were filed in each nation concurrently, one
court might stay the matter on the basis of comity so as to allow
the other to proceed alone. The analysis would be different, but it
would consider some of the same issues arising in a forum non
conveniens-based motion. For example, one court might consider
the other to have better access to the evidence or witnesses, or to
be the nation the laws of which are likely to be applicable. Forum
non conveniens arises when there is one case filed, but the court
rules that another possible forum is a better forum. When the
case is dismissed there is no other case pending.
Dahl states that when a case has been filed in one forum that
has jurisdiction, preemptive jurisdiction precludes jurisdiction
from existing in another forum. 4 There thus could never be paral-
lel litigation-two courts with cases based on the same dispute.
That rule would apply whether or not the first case filed continued
to a judgment, or whether it failed on procedural grounds. Failing
on procedural grounds, such as forum non conveniens, inadequate
service or perhaps even failure to name the defendants correctly,
would forevermore bar that matter from being initiated in the
other jurisdiction. The doctrine as Dahl describes it would appar-
ently allow the intended defendant in the U.S. to race into the
foreign court, making the intended plaintiff a defendant in his
own nation, to seek a ruling on either the absence of the U.S.
party's responsibility or the presence of responsibility of the for-
eign party that caused injury to the company. Instead of counter-
claiming in an action in the United States, the would-be defendant
would sue first abroad as a plaintiff, and then claim preemption
when the later suit would be filed in the United States by the
other party. Dahl's comments suggest that many Latin American
nations have not yet developed very sophisticated approaches to
72. See id.
73. See id. at 28-29 nn.36-39.
74. See id. at 28-29.
2006] 157
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1
complex, cross-border litigation. That is true, but such develop-
ment must occur if these nations are to achieve significant eco-
nomic development. Should not Dahl's efforts be directed to
assisting in this development, rather than outsourcing complex,
cross-border litigation to U.S. courts?
E. Indelibility of Jurisdiction
5
Jurisdictional indelibility is unknown in the United States.
Allegedly originating in Roman law, the doctrine disallows one
court to substitute itself for another after a case is first filed, after
it "starts hearing" the case.76 Does this "start" mean the first oral
hearing? Perhaps the closest analogy in the United States is
removal from state to federal court, but that is not a substitution
by the state court.77 Dahl cites, in support of this theory of an
action of a U.S. court causing illegality in Latin America, a single
provision of the Nicaraguan Civil Code. No forum non conveniens
ruling in the United States has ever attempted to substitute a for-
eign court over which it had no jurisdiction for a U.S. court.
F. Lis Pendens
7 8
This argument by Dahl essentially repeats the prior two, that
a court beginning to hear a case by such action causes the cessa-
tion of jurisdiction over the subject matter in all foreign courts. It
is a novel extraterritorial extension of one nation's law. The prin-
cipal problem with this argument, as with many presented by
Dahl, is that it refers specifically to legal doctrines that exist in
one or more nations in Latin America but not in the United
States.79 Since Dahl presumably is challenging U.S. legal norms,
75. See id. at 29.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 29 n.39.
78. See id. at 29.
79. Dahl's authorities are provisions of the Costa Rican and Bustamante Codes.
See Dahl, supra note 5, at 29 n.40. He also cites a Texas statute referring to
continuing jurisdiction. See id. at 29 n.41. That provision, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 71.051 (2006), is part of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code that
was adopted in 1993 in response to Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W. 2d
674, 679 (Tex. 1990), where former Texas provision § 71.031 was held to prohibit
forum non conveniens dismissals. The section has been amended several times and
includes the language Dahl cites, which follows the portions that make it clear that
forum non conveniens is part of Texas law, but allows the court to retain jurisdiction
so that a case might be returned to Texas if the defendants failed to comply with
terms or conditions imposed. It does not suggest that the court would reassume




he ought to focus on U.S. legal doctrine to challenge such norms,
rather than doctrines of Latin American nations.
G. Sovereignty80
Dahl begins with his early and persistently most fatal flaw,
that the U.S. court actually orders the plaintiff to go home and file
suit.81 The U.S. court does not. It only dismisses the case because
the U.S. court concludes that the plaintiff has a better forum than
the U.S. court. If the defendant, or its nation, wants to make that
nation unavailable selectively that is the prerogative of that for-
eign nation's sovereignty. The U.S. ruling does not trespass on
the foreign nation's sovereign right to allow or disallow its citizens
to sue in its own courts. Dahl is disingenuous to twist this into a
sovereign right of a foreign nation's individuals to sue in a U.S.
court. That is a violation of what seems the apogee of irritability
to Dahl, an effect on a nation's sovereign rights. Apparently, to
Dahl, sovereign rights of Latin American nations are more sover-
eign than those of the United States.
H. Treaty Supremacy
8 2
Dahl encouragingly turns to the application of international
law in U.S. courts after repeatedly urging the application of the
domestic laws of many Latin American nations. A treaty
becomes domestic law in the United States when enacted by Con-
gress. 4 It is subordinate to the Constitution but parallel to other
80. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 30.
81. See id. Dahl strangely cites to the unadopted OAS proposals. See id. at 30
n.43. These OAS proposals have no authority and would only apply if the judge
actually orders the plaintiff to file in the foreign country. He also cites to the Costa
Rican law with which one can hardly disagree, that a foreign court cannot impose
jurisdiction upon a Costa Rican court. See id. at 30 n.44. Forum non conveniens only
dismisses a case in the forum that issues the dismissal; it does not order the filing of
that suit in any other forum. The cite that must be challenged is that to Guatemalan
law, which allegedly rules a dismissal in a U.S. court "invalid" when it involves a
Guatemalan plaintiff. See id. Two cites that Dahl makes, to the refiled Aguilar v.
Dow case in Costa Rica, and the refiled Aguilera v. Shell case in Nicaragua, merit
more discussion in the text. See id. They both illustrate what is so needed in these
protesting nations, a system of their own where these cases may be brought under
local law in procedures providing such satisfactory due process that decisions will be
enforced abroad.
82. Dahl, supra note 5, at 30.
83. See id. at 25-31.
84. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); see also MARK W. JANIS,
Chapter 2: Treaties, in AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1993); SEAN
D. MURPHY, Chapter 7: Foreign Relations Law of the United States, in PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, 221 (2006).
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statutory law.8" Dahl is correct in suggesting that a treaty could
abrogate the use of forum non conveniens by U.S. courts. But the
question is whether any currently applicable treaties have done
so. While Dahl cites an OAS (Organization of American States)
"treaty," there is no provision in the formative OAS treaty that
addresses this issue. 6 The OAS documents Dahl cites are two
"proposals" put forth at OAS annual meetings that have no force
of law." We should not believe that law is what we only wish it to
be.
Dahl states that forum non conveniens violates a series of
bilateral conventions that provide equal treatment and open
courts, noting the Peace, Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce
("PFNC") treaties in force between the United States and several
of the nations which have adopted the subject forum shopping
support laws. s Dahl might do well to focus more on this argu-
ment, because as his notes indicate, such treaties provide for bilat-
eral rights.8 9 The one case he cites, Blanco v. Banco Industrial de
Venezuela, held that such a treaty between the United States and
Venezuela requires identical forum non conveniens treatment to
foreign and domestic plaintiffs.90 That is not exactly what Dahl is
arguing for, since he claims an absolute right to access to the
courts unencumbered by dismissal before trial, not rights equal to
those granted to U.S. citizens.91 The Blanco decision, despite this
interpretation of the treaty, went on to apply forum non con-
veniens and find Venezuela to be an available and adequate
forum, dismissing the action.92 These PFNC treaties are intended
to allow foreign citizens of the other nations who are lawfully in
85. See Murphy, supra note 84, at 221; see, e.g., Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332
(1924); United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(addressing the hierarchy of treaty and later statutes).
86. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 30 n.45.
87. See id. at 21 n.2.
88. See id. at 31 n.48.
89. See id.
90. See Blanco v. Banco Indus. De Venez., 997 F.2d 974, 981 (2d Cir. 1993).
91. It would be interesting to know whether Dahl believes that foreign plaintiffs
filing in a U.S. state court have the right not to be dismissed in favor of a more
convenient U.S. federal court. If that is the case, then foreign plaintiffs may also be
entitled to remain where they file even when removal provisions apply to shift the
matter from a perceived plaintiff-friendly state court to a perceived less plaintiff-
friendly federal court.
92. See Blanco, 997 F.2d 974. There was even a mutual consent to use the New
York courts in the parties' contract. See id. at 976. The court stated that "the presence
of an adequate Venezuelan forum, and the strong adverse balance of Gilbert private
and public factors, outweigh the initial choice of [the foreign plaintiffl of a New York
forum." Id. at 981.
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the United States rights of access to courts equal to those of U.S.
citizens. They do not address the rights of foreign nationals not
lawfully in the United States to forum shop, enter and initiate
suit. The PFNC treaties have not proven useful to foreign plain-
tiffs. FNC (forum non conveniens) has trumped PFNC.
Dahl does not venture far in international law and forum non
conveniens. Beyond his treaty argument, he does not suggest that
forum non conveniens violates any principles of customary inter-
national law. That is a little surprising due to his frequent refer-
ences to both the Bustamante Code and the collective decisions of
various groups of Latin American nations' courts, legislatures and
attorneys-general.93 Dahl is certainly aware that the source of
international law is not the nations in Latin America that have
adopted the Bustamante Code. Perhaps he had read a draft of co-
symposium presenter Bernard Oxman's article.94 Oxman notes
very early, "I am aware of no rule of customary international law
to the effect that plaintiffs choice of forum must be honored or
extinguishes the jurisdiction of other courts."95
Dahl also refers to the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, and a Texas Supreme Court decision that sup-
ports his theory of access to U.S. courts without subjection to
forum non conveniens-based dismissals.9 s But that decision
addressed subject matter jurisdiction and access, not special treat-
ment for foreign plaintiffs to be exempt from forum non con-
veniens-based motions.9'
The challenge to forum non conveniens that Dahl promotes
did not become part of the discussion of the United States in the
terminated negotiations for an international convention on juris-
diction and judgment enforcement.98 Nor was it considered by the
93. See Dahl, supra note 5.
94. See Oxman, supra note 8. Oxman refers to the "creative interpretations" of
forum non conveniens presented at the symposium, and states that a U.S. court would
"be on solid ground in refusing to yield to such an obvious attempt by a foreign state
and its courts to control access to courts in the United States." Id. at 128.
95. Oxman, supra note 8, at 123.
96. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 31 & n.50 (citing Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12
S.W. 3d 71, 82 (Tex. 2000)).
97. See Dubai, 12 S.W. 3d 71.
98. The one product forthcoming from the negotiations for a jurisdiction and
judgment recognition and enforcement treaty was the Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 (2005) [hereinafter Hague
Convention]. That Convention makes no provision for forum non conveniens. The
current challenge to forum non conveniens may prove to be an obstacle for any future
convention, if the common law tradition nations that adhere to forum non conveniens
insist that the theory is preserved by the convention. See Louise Ellen Teitz, Choice of
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United Kingdom when the Brussels Convention was negotiated. 99
If negotiations are renewed for an international convention, the
impact on forum non conveniens will surely be debated and could
be a reason for further inability to reach any agreement.
L Jurisdictional Waivers, Submissions and
Stipulations are Void °°
Refiling abroad is a voluntary act, done freely and spontane-
ously, to use Dahl's language. 10 But U.S. courts do not order the
dismissed foreign plaintiff to refile abroad. There is no U.S. court
process to follow up and assure that the plaintiff has filed abroad.
The foreign plaintiff is not asked or required to waive, submit or
stipulate to anything by the U.S. court. It is the defendant who
must agree to stipulations that are clearly to the benefit of the
plaintiff, but which to Dahl are violations of the foreign nation's
sovereignty. These include submission to jurisdiction and waiver
of any right to raise a statute of limitations defense. U.S. courts
have been sensitive to imposing demands on the foreign court. In
the famous Bhopal litigation the federal appellate court affirmed
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds but overturned stipu-
lations that the defendant consent to broad discovery that might
exceed Indian rules of procedure and consent to enforcement of a
judgment that essentially met New York standards of due pro-
cess. I0 ' The appellate court was thus sensitive to avoiding any
impingement upon Indian judicial sovereignty. Dahl is correct in
his comment that any of the defendant's stipulations in a U.S.
Court Clauses and Third Countries from a U.S. Perspective: Challenges to
Predictability, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE AND RELATIONS WITH
THIRD STATES 285 (A. Nuyts & N. Watt6 eds. 2005).
99. The Brussels Convention, superceded by the Brussels Regulation, was drafted
by a group of predominantly civil law tradition nation delegates. The doctrine of
forum non conveniens is unknown to the civil law tradition, and has been held as
inconsistent with the Convention/Regulation. See Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, Case C-
281/02, 2005 E.C.R. 1-1383. Parlantino's challenge is thus consistent with the view of
the civil law tradition nations in Europe.
100. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 32 & n.51. Once again, his authority is based on
OAS proposals, lacking any status as law. His added citations as authority for U.S.
courts are Bolivian and Guatemalan code provisions and attorney general opinions,
neither having any force of law in a U.S. court. See id. at 32 n.52. They have
considerable value to the water's edge of their homelands, but do not lap the shores of
the United States.
101. See id. at 32.
102. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec.,
1984, 809 F.2d 195 (1987).
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court "are meaningless in Latin America."" 3 But this is just as
true as stating that any of the plaintiffs beneficial rulings from
his foreign court, whether based on the Bustamante Code or vari-
ous sources in his own or other Latin American nations, are mean-
ingless in the United States.
J. Honesty Towards the Foreign Court'"
One can hardly argue with Dahl that "Latin American liti-
gants must be loyal and truthful to their respective courts."' ° In
Dahl's view that means the plaintiff, when initiating the claim in
his nation after a dismissal in the United States, must outline the
full history of the case, apparently meaning the history in the
United States. I am not aware of any such procedural rule in civil
law nations. Certainly a foreign plaintiff who initiated a claim in
the United States and received a judgment that was subsequently
fully satisfied should not file the same claim at home. But when a
case is dismissed in the United States under forum non con-
veniens, such disclosure only serves to trigger the use of the for-
eign forum shopping support statute, which would not be
triggered if the plaintiff first brought suit in his nation rather
than the United States. I cannot quarrel with Dahl's suggestion
that the plaintiff should be able to file freely the suit and then
state that he believes that the court lacks jurisdiction, however
strange that may appear. The court may disagree and proceed,
allowing the plaintiff to pursue the case to judgment. Dahl is con-
cerned that if the case is dismissed and returned to the United
States, the U.S. court may be concerned that the filing by the
plaintiff only served the purpose of allowing the plaintiff an oppor-
tunity to object to its own suit. In the Ecuadorian shrimp litiga-
tion, the plaintiff returned to Ecuador after a U.S. state court
dismissed the case. 06 After the cases were dismissed in Ecuador,
they were re-filed in the United States, only to be dismissed
again.0 7 The U.S. court was dismayed over the foreign procedure,
where the party filed the suit and then sought dismissal and filed
103. Dahl, supra note 5, at 32.
104. See id.
105. See id. Dahl provides no citations to any Latin American nation's codes that
follow his "full history" theory. See id. at 32-33.
106. See Ciba-Geigy Ltd., BASF A.G. v. Fish Peddler, Inc., 691 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1997).
107. See In re Ecuadorian Shrimp Litig., 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 767a (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1999).
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an appeal that it did not pursue."' 8 Dahl is concerned that a for-
eign plaintiff trying to reinstitute suit in the United States after
seeking dismissal in his own country will be accused of having
"sabotaged" the case in his country. 1 9 He views dismissal of the
reinstituted case as procedural "punishment" for being honest
with the foreign judge. That is an excessively harsh view of a rul-
ing based not on punishment but on the foreign party's attempt to
force a case upon a U.S. court that is better litigated in the foreign
nation, and in which the United States has less interest than the
foreign nation should have.
K Appeals in the United States"'
Dahl expresses concern that while a plaintiff whose suit was
dismissed in the lower court in the United States is in the process
of pursuing the suit in his own nation, the U.S. appellate court
might reverse the matter."' That would seem to place the plain-
tiff in a very favorable position. He is allowed to continue the suit
in the United States, while having the case in his own country
placed on hold-formally stayed if procedure so allows. Dahl sees
the appeal as taking the case away from the plaintiff, assuming,
once again, more than the decision represents. If, as Dahl sup-
poses, the U.S. court overrules a forum non conveniens decision
two years after ruling in favor of the U.S. defendant, it can only
mean that the foreign plaintiff may decide to follow either of two
routes, pursuing the litigation in either nation. How can that
plaintiff be upset when he has won the right to continue in the
United States and also has established the beginning stages of a
similar suit in his own country? Dahl is wrong when he suggests
that the reversal by the U.S. appellate court "divests" the foreign
court of jurisdiction.11 2 If jurisdiction is divested it is by the for-
eign court that decides to prefer the U.S. litigation. The only rea-
son for the appeal is that the foreign plaintiff filed the appeal. He
must have done so with the hope that he would win, and might
108. See id.
109. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 32.
110. See id. at 33.
111. See id. at 33 & n.56. Dahl cites Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.2d 795 (9th
Cir. 2001), where the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal reversed a dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds. The reversal was not on the forum non conveniens issue, but
rather federal question and instrumentalities issues. Thus the then pending certiori
motions referred to by Dahl were not directed to the forum non conveniens issue. See
Dahl, supra note 5, at 33 n.56. See further comment on Patrickson infra at notes 212-
215.
112. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 32.
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thus discontinue the action in his country. Dahl argues on the one
hand that forum non conveniens denies foreign persons the right
to pursue a matter in a U.S. court, and on the other hand denies
that same person the right to pursue the matter in his own nation.
L. Appeals in Latin America
1 3
Dahl expresses concern that U.S. courts want a final judg-
ment stating that there is no jurisdiction in the foreign court
before reinstatement may be considered."' The U.S. defendant is
likely to appeal a dismissal in the foreign court, and if successful
the matter in the U.S. remains dismissed. Dahl believes that
requiring a final judgment delays the foreign plaintiff in returning
to the U.S. forum and that an appeal should not be required
because the plaintiff "believes the decision to be correct.""' That
raises serious questions about Dahl's understanding of the appel-
late process. An appeal is apparently only appropriate when the
decision is against the Latin American plaintiff (because he
believes it is correct), not when it is against the U.S. defendant.
Dahl even suggests that any appeal by the U.S. defendant would
be in bad faith."1 6 It is common to require a final judgment in one
country before another country's courts take action. The most
applicable example is the enforcement of a foreign judgment,
available only when the foreign judgment is final, meaning
appeals have been completed."7 I suspect that Dahl fears that
appeals will not let the forum shopping support statutes stand,
supported by recent history that illustrates that these laws have
not been uniformly well received in their own nations."18
113. See id. at 33.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. This is most inconsistent with Dahl's comments on the deficiencies of
Latin American legal systems. Id. at 37-42. If these systems functioned so efficiently
and honestly as to be unimpeachable, then perhaps decisions of the lower courts
should be unappealable. Regrettably, few Latin American jurists have such faith in
their own systems.
117. See UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, § 2, 13 Part II
U.L.A. 46 (2002) ("This act applies to any foreign judgment that is final and
conclusive ..."). The UFMJRA has been adopted by a majority of the states and
essentially codifies common law that remains applicable in the remainder of the
states.
118. Dahl's appendix itself reveals Ecuador and Guatemala have both overruled
portions of their blocking statutes. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 48.
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M. Latin American Courts Lack Power to Constrain
Defendants Without Assets in Latin America119
It is sound policy for a corporation from any developed nation
to be careful about what assets it locates in a high-risk developing
nation. One has only to wonder about the risk of current foreign
investments in Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela, three of the
nations Dahl includes in his discussion. Thus, his concern that
foreign corporations have been structured to minimize their assets
in high risk nations may find sympathy in those nations, but is
the only way such nations can attract needed foreign investment.
That is not an unfair "privileged situation;" it is a reality of invest-
ment risk throughout the world.12 0 For every Bolivia or Venezuela
that expropriates foreign investment, there are nations in Asia or
Eastern Europe that welcome it and offer less risk.
Dahl's real concern seems to be that a judgment rendered in
Latin America against a U.S. defendant might be challenged
when it is filed in a U.S. court for recognition and enforcement.2"
If a foreign judgment is rendered in a fair process that provided
due process, the judgment will be enforced in the United States.
Dahl finds it strange that a case that is initiated in a U.S. court
should be sent to a foreign forum for trial, only to be returned to
the United States where it might not be enforced.'2 2 That is not
strange at all. The case was not transferred to a foreign forum; it
was dismissed. It was then voluntarily filed in an alternative, for-
eign forum. It would come back to the United States not as part of
the original case filed in the United States, but as a recognition
and enforcement action of the foreign decision. Enforcement of a
judgment rendered in one nation in the courts of another nation is
not a right. Enforcement is subject to a review of the decision,
with considerable focus on due process, an element lacking in far
too many of the world's legal systems. The global system would
function better if many of the Latin American nations focused
more on legal reform than trying to shift the responsibility for con-
ducting trials to the United States. Dahl is to some degree argu-
ing for jurisdiction based on assets rather than where the
defendant is domiciled (his first argument). Asset and domicile
locations are not necessarily the same. Both are foundations for
jurisdiction in many nations, as well as where the injury occurred.
119. See id. at 33.





Forum non conveniens merely tries to locate the matter in the
most appropriate forum.
N. Effect of the Illegality
123
The premise for this discussion has the flaw repeated from
the first argument, that refusing to assert jurisdiction and proceed
to trial in the United States is illegal. 124 Yet Dahl has presented
no U.S. or international law that supports his argument, relying
on laws of the plaintiffs' nations. 125 The Latin American nations
are not prevented from asserting jurisdiction by any actions but
the impact of their own foreign forum-shopping legislative enact-
ments. The motion to dismiss in a U.S. court does not generate
jurisdiction in the foreign nation.126 Near the end of his article
Dahl suggests that because U.S. courts are acting illegally in
using forum non conveniens, the foreign forum shopping support
statutes are unnecessary.1 27 That is apparently premised on all
U.S. courts complying with the Bustamante Code and not dis-
missing any action brought in the jurisdiction where a defendant
is domiciled in the United States.
0. Instance Where Forum Non Conveniens May Not
Cause Illegalities1
2
Dahl next suggests that there is one instance where forum
non conveniens does not constitute an illegal action. That is when
a forum non conveniens-based motion to dismiss made by a Latin
American corporate defendant is granted and the case transfers to
the jurisdiction where the defendant is domiciled.1 29 Dahl raises
the non-exclusive doctrine of actio sequitur forum rei, which
means that a civil action follows the forum of the residence of the
defendant. 3 ° This apparently mandates such transfer because
"Latin American systems dictate" that the defendant be sued
123. See id. at 35.
124. See id.
125. See id. Dahl relies on various Latin American authorities to conclude that
forum non conveniens "violates Latin American notions of procedural freedom." Id. at
35 n.63. His authorities have no affect on U.S. courts.
126. See id. at 35.
127. See id. at 43.
128. See id. at 35.
129. See id.
130. See id. Dahl may have meant abyssus abyssum invocat (one misstep leads to
another), which applies to the initial mistaken assumption that forum non conveniens
gives orders compelling or coercing foreign courts to accept jurisdiction. See EUGENE
EHRLICH, AMO, AMAS, AMAT AND MORE 17 (1985).
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where it is domiciled. 131 But the place of domicile of the defendant
is not the exclusive location of jurisdiction. Latin American sys-
tems also dictate that a suit may be brought at the location of the
injury. The substance of Dahl's argument is that Latin American
systems dictate where the matter must be heard whether or not
that rule attempts to apply to foreign courts. Dahl's theory thus
changes with this paragraph. Forum non conveniens is not dead.
It is unlawfully applied to send a case brought by a Latin Ameri-
can plaintiff against a U.S. corporation defendant to the plaintiffs
home court, but lawfully applied by a Latin American corporation
defendant to get away from the U.S. court and defend the suit in
its home nation.
132
Dahl was not pleased with the Ecuadorian shrimp litigation,
where a Miami court dismissed a second challenge to forum non
conveniens after Law 55 was passed.'33 In the Ecuadorian shrimp
litigation some Ecuadorian shrimp farmers sued BASF, Ciba-
Geigy and Del Monte in a U.S. court.' The case was dismissed.
135
The shrimp farmers had the option of suing BASF in Germany,
and Ciba-Geigy in Switzerland, their respective domiciles, or all
three defendants in Ecuador; but they sued in the United
States. '36 Under Dahl's theory that forum non conveniens may be
lawfully used by defendants to dismiss a case in favor of trying it
where the defendant is domiciled, BASF might have properly
sought dismissal in favor of bringing suit in Germany and Ciba-
Geigy might have done the same to bring the'suit in Switzerland.
Neither the German nor Swiss courts have the benefits the Latin
Americans seek, but under Dahl's theory they would have to be
satisfied with litigation in Germany and Switzerland rather than
131. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 35.
132. That seems not unlike an argument made by the administrators of a
Guatemalan corporation sued in the United States-that the case must be
transferred to Guatemala because only Guatemalan courts are permitted to interpret
Guatemalan law. This author was a consultant-expert in that case. See Lisa, S.A. v.
Gutierrez, No. 99-03519 (11th Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999) (on file with the author). The U.S.
court rejected the novel argument that a country has an exclusive right to interpret
its own laws. Perhaps this author is remiss in not thinking that Latin American law
is what Latin Americans tell us it is; it is not for us to examine on our own. We can
simply not understand Bustamante's reach, and should not try. We should just agree.
If that were the case I would be denied delving into the richness of many Latin
American ideas, such as amparo.
133. Ciba-Geigy Ltd. BASF A.G. v. Fish Peddler, 691 So. 2d. 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997).
134. See id. at 1113.
135. See id. at 1126.
136. See id. at 1113.
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in the United States. In the shrimp litigation, the court made no
order regarding where the suit might be brought upon dismis-
sal.'37 None was brought in Germany or Switzerland. Having
found Ecuador a proper forum, the case did not go on to consider
the German or Swiss forums as also proper.13 The U.S. court
seemed a most inappropriate forum for a suit by Ecuadorians
against German and Swiss companies. That should not trouble
Dahl because his theories are all premised on jurisdiction based
on deep pockets, contingent-fee contracts and punitive damages.
P. U.S. Rulings about Alternative Jurisdiction'39
Dahl suggests that U.S. case law is unclear on forum non con-
veniens. 40 I agree. It is partly because U.S. judges have not
always fully understood the complexities of the theory and partly
because different courts have fairly interpreted the law in seem-
ingly inconsistent manners. Dahl does not cite the lack of predict-
ability as a reason for his concerns.' The law certainly is not
clear in accomplishing what Dahl wishes it to do: respond to the
dictates of the Bustamante Code. Dahl should not wait for that to
happen. The Bustamante Code has no future in the jurisprudence
of the United States. But it is not surprising that forum non con-
veniens is confusing to civil law-trained lawyers because as a doc-
trine developed in the courts over decades, if not centuries, it lacks
the attempt to set forth code-like rules encompassing every possi-
ble variation. It can often involve complex interpretations,
although nowhere nearly as unclear as personal jurisdiction in
U.S. courts when the defendant is foreign, and the court must sort
out the meaning of "steam of commerce," minimum contacts and
due process."' The European Union Court of Justice has used
such lack of predictability as a reason to rule that the U.K.'s use of
forum non conveniens is unacceptable and found a violation of the
E.U. (Brussels) Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Regulation and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.4 3
Dahl presents five "considerations" to explain the concerns he
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1117.
139. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 35.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 35-37.
142. See Friederich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVis L.
REV. 1027 (1995).
143. See generally, Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. 1-1383.
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has with U.S. forum non conveniens rulings.'" They make clear
his attempt to codify the doctrine using foreign concepts. First,
Dahl identifies the "alternative" forum with availability. " 5 The
"alternative forum" test actually has two prongs: adequacy and
availability. "6 "Adequacy" originally questioned whether the for-
eign forum provided a fair opportunity to the plaintiff to have his
charges heard, but has developed to include whether or not the
foreign forum is so corrupt, intimidating, unfair and inefficient
that it cannot be said to be adequate. "7 "Availability" originally
focused on whether the plaintiff had the right to bring the suit in
his nation, without regard to possible concurrent jurisdiction in
any other nation.'48 But the availability analysis has more
recently addressed the foreign forum shopping support laws about
which Dahl writes. "9 This analysis almost universally rejects
those laws as acts that attempt to incorporate into forum non con-
veniens theory actions of foreign plaintiffs and their nations' legis-
lators that allow the foreign plaintiff to initially choose his own
forum or to reject it and bring suit in the United States, the latter
choice generating an automatic cessation of an otherwise proper
jurisdictional basis in the foreign nation.1 50 The "true test" that
Dahl mentions, "whether foreign jurisdiction is available, not in
abstract terms, but pursuant to a [forum non conveniens] order,"
is simply not the test that has been applied in U.S. courts. 5'
Second, Dahl laments that U.S. courts in the "overwhelming
majority of cases" have overlooked the "illegal effects [forum non
conveniens] causes in Latin America."'52 He suggests the reason is
that plaintiffs have not raised these effects.'53 Any American law-
yer arguing the applicability of the Bustamante Code or the laws
of specific Latin American nations in a U.S. court that is deter-
144. Dahl, supra note 5, at 35-37.
145. Id. at 35-36.
146. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 420 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2005);
Kamel v. Hill-Rom Co., 108 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Air Crash Disaster
Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1165 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
147. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078 (1997). But see Stalinski
v. Bakoczy, 41 F. Supp. 2d 755 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (distinguishing Eastman and holding
Honduras to be an adequate forum).
148. See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 159 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1998).
149. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d
1125 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
150. See Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D. Tex. 2004); In re
Eduadorian Shrimp Litig., 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 767a (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999).





mining jurisdiction is subject to ridicule at best and censure at
worst. The reasons that plaintiffs have not raised Dahl's argu-
ments of the illegality of forum non conveniens is that they have
good sense not to. If U.S. court forum non conveniens rulings
cause displeasure in Latin America, those nations ought to think
of legal reform that provides an honest, accessible court system
and laws that offer the advantages that seem to them to exist only
in the United States. Nothing would please this author more,
after forty years of study of comparative law with substantial
emphasis on Latin America, than to be able to view Latin Ameri-
can legal systems as uniformly fair and conscious of due process as
those of Canada, the United States and most of Europe, including
the root systems of most of Latin America-Spain and Portugal.
Third, Dahl condemns some U.S. case law of "suspicious
legality" because he rejects the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Piper that gives less deference to foreigners. '54 Although Dahl
rejects Piper, if he purports to understand U.S. precedent, he must
acknowledge that it is the law. His argument that Latin Ameri-
cans are entitled to deference because Latin American law says so
is unsound, as is his argument based on the PFNC treaties. He
mentions only the Blanco decision in a manner that fails to pre-
sent its ruling accurately.'
Fourth, Dahl suggests that U.S. judicial decisions lack credi-
bility when they are inconsistent with "judicial decisions, special
statutes, legal opinions from the respective attorneys general and
other official documents" of the Latin American nations. 5 s Such a
statement deserves little comment or respect; it is contrary to the
most fundamental notions of independence and sovereignty.
Fifth and finally, Dahl states that a reason U.S. decisions are
incorrect is that "Latin American judicial decisions expressly ana-
lyzing the [forum non conveniens] issue have ruled for lack of
jurisdiction."157 Dahl knows that Latin American precedent has
no binding effect in U.S. courts. U.S. courts often consider foreign
decisions that address areas undeveloped in U.S. law. 5 ' I am una-
ware of any of the many forum non conveniens decisions of state
and federal courts in the United States that have found any gui-
dance whatsoever in Latin America decisions considering forum
154. Id.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
156. Dahl, supra note 5, at 36.
157. Id.
158. A classic case is Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1953) (referring to
Roman, Austrian, French, German, Italian and Swiss law as sources).
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non conveniens. If those nations have considered forum non con-
veniens it has not been while interpreting domestic law, but
rather in attempting to reject U.S. forum non conveniens decisions
that have dismissed cases brought by their nationals.
Dahl's conclusion that by considering his five points "Ameri-
can decisions for [forum non conveniens] will become less preva-
lent" is more aspirational than prophetic.159 The trend in the
United States clearly is to increase the use of forum non con-
veniens to rid the courts of cases brought by foreign forum shop-
pers that should not be litigated in U.S. courts. 6 ° Dahl believes
with some justification that Martinez v. Dow Chemical Co. reflects
his aspiration."6 ' In Martinez, a Louisiana federal district court
held that Costa Rica was unavailable as a forum because the Code
of Civil Procedure did not provide for jurisdiction over the defen-
dant in Costa Rica because it found the acts occurred in the defen-
dant's offices in the United States.'62 The court also considered
the Bustamante Code, to which Costa Rica is a party, but failed to
distinguish between using the Code to determine whether Costa
Rica would assert jurisdiction and using it to find jurisdiction in
the United States.'63 The court ought to have confirmed clearly
that the Bustamante Code is not U.S. law. The court was also
unsound in its suggestions that dismissing the matter might
result in a forced lawsuit in Costa Rica."M This is a misunder-
standing on the part of the court that Dahl has made; a dismissal
on forum non conveniens grounds is not a coercion and compulsion
159. Dahl, supra note 5, at 36. Judges familiar with Dahl's arguments might do the
opposite: affirm more clearly the viability of forum non conveniens.
160. See Republic of Bol. V. Philip Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Tex.
1999); Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1996).
161. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 36; see also Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F.
Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. La. 2002).
162. See Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d. at 726. The claimed injuries were from the use
of nematocides produced by the defendant and used on banana plantations. See id. at
721-22. Nematocides and nearly all other pesticides are products requiring strict
observance of safe practices. However, the actual injuries do not occur at the home
office of the producers, but at the agricultural locations in the foreign nations where
they are used. See Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 721-22. The tort may occur at any
location between the design and the application of the product. See Vasquez v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 674 (5th Cir. 2003). The Martinez court
appears to have failed to recognize the fact that either or both the United States and
the foreign nation may have been the location of the tort. If any part of the
production, sale or use of the product took place in Costa Rica, that nation might have
jurisdiction under Article 46 (3) of the Costa Rican Code of Civil Procedure. See
Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
163. See Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 727-28.
164. See id. at 728.
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order.'65 Dahl is proper to place considerable weight in Martinez.
But it is this author's view that Martinez, rather than being "in
the forefront of decisions"166 analyzing foreign law as Dahl sug-
gests, will continue to have its foundations and fatal flaws chal-
lenged and exposed, and will have little influence on the
development of forum non conveniens. 6  The case focuses quickly
on the availability issue to establish that the foreign court does
not have jurisdiction, for whatever reason, including acts of the
plaintiff to remove jurisdiction in its home courts. 68 The court
never reaches the consideration of private and public interest fac-
tors.'69 I suspect that the doctrine of forum non conveniens will
not be abolished by a movement promoted by a few small Latin
American nations to support their nationals' forum shopping in
the United States.
1 70
In addition to the allegation of illegal affects in Latin
America, Dahl next argues that when a case is transferred to
Latin America evidence is lost. 17' But in each of the examples
upon which he relies, injuries that may have been caused by torts
have occurred in the respective Latin American countries, and
thus most of the evidence relating to the alleged torts is in Latin
America.' 72 He makes the curious statement that "proof in the
165. The Martinez decision, rendered in Louisiana, which has retained many of its
civil law roots, gives far more credibility to the civil law, and especially the
Bustamante Code, than can be found in decisions from any other district. That may
underlie the rejection of this decision in a Texas Federal District Court in Morales v.
Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672 & n.3 (S.D. Tex. 2004), and in a Missouri
appellate court in Chandler v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Corp., 163 S.W.3d 537, 547 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2005), as well as its inconsistency with the Fifth Circuit case Vasquez v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2003).
166. Dahl, supra note 5, at 36.
167. The Martinez court clearly departed from Delgado, where the Texas federal
court dismissed cases brought by multiple plaintiffs from Costa Rica, Nicaragua and
Panama. See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1372-73 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
Martinez traces that case to the initiation and dismissal of the cases in Costa Rica
after their dismissal in Texas, but does not mention that they were again dismissed
when returned to Texas. Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 729. That final dismissal was
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000).
Since Martinez was not decided until July 2002, one wonders why the court noted
only that the Delgado case's refiling in Texas "remain[ed] pending." Martinez, 219 F.
Supp. 2d at 729. Martinez likely would not survive a federal circuit court review.
168. See Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 725-28.
169. See id. at 726.
170. The plaintiffs in Martinez were clearly forum shopping. They first filed in a
plaintiff-friendly state court in Jefferson Parish in Louisiana. The case was moved to
federal court. See Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
171. Dahl, supra note 5, at 37.
172. See id. at 37-40.
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[United States] carries more weight and is much easier to obtain
than in Latin American systems."173 If Latin American systems
indeed lack a requirement that a case be proven, then no case
would be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds under the
adequacy test. What Dahl must mean is that U.S. procedures
allow a wider span of evidence to be accessible by discovery. That
greater access to evidence, Dahl relates, is an important factor in
why the foreign forum shopping support statutes were enacted.
174
If a case in Latin America is unable to function at any better level
than admitting some twenty percent of the evidence that would be
admissible in the United States,7 5 these systems are indeed inad-
equate. Dahl's criticism of Latin American systems is extended to
civil law systems in general,' 76 and thus raises the question
whether any civil law system, be it from Guatemala, Ecuador or
Brazil in Latin America, or Germany, France or Italy in Europe,
should be considered an adequate forum.
177
IV. DAHL'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CRITICAL NEED FOR
REFORM OF PROCEDURAL RULES IN LATIN AMERICA
Dahl's next focus is on six areas where evidence rules and
practice differ in Latin America and the United States.' He
appears to favor the U.S. rules in each category, including absence
of depositions, absence of discovery (he means less extensive dis-
covery), restrictions on the number of permissible witnesses and
exclusion of critical witnesses, limitation on the use of experts,
inadequate power to compel production of documents (really
included within his discovery concern), and lack of willingness to
cooperate with other nations in producing evidence such as partic-
ipation in the Hague Taking of Evidence Convention.'79 All of
these beg for reform in Latin America. If Latin American eviden-
tiary rules are as collectively poor as Dahl suggests, perhaps not
173. See id. at 37.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 37 n.69. Dahl cites an article on class actions in Brazil that extends
the author's views of evidentiary deficiencies to all civil law tradition nations. See id.
However, the movement within many civil law systems is to reform the civil process
both to allow more evidence and to provide processes that will actually work to admit
such evidence. The recent experience in Spain is discussed in Nadal, supra note 36.
177. The citation in Dahl at note 89 is especially telling about the inadequacies of
the Brazilian legal system. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 42 n.89; see also Antonio Gidi,
Class Actions in Brazil, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 311, 319-20.




one Latin American nation is an adequate forum for a matter and
no judgments that are rendered in such systems should ever be
enforced in the United States. But surely Dahl does not believe
this. To paraphrase Mark Twain, "reports of my legal system's
inadequacies are greatly exaggerated.' '" 0
Dahl describes these characteristics to support his main pro-
position, not that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is illegal,
but that it fails to understand that Latin American legal systems
are, in his view, inadequate. If so, that renders the availability
consideration unnecessary. Whether or not he is correct, U.S.
courts have not been inclined to broadly label civil law systems as
inherently inadequate forums. When they have ruled another
nation to be an inadequate forum for forum non conveniens or
enforcement of judgment rulings, it has usually been after careful
analysis and documentation of multiple deficiencies of that system
that render it unable to provide for a fair resolution of any civil
matter."18
Why hasn't Dahl focused on the need for more procedural
reform in Latin America? He clearly seems to believe that many
Latin American nations cannot effectively deal with the kind of
tort claims that have become increasingly common throughout the
world. It is not at all clear, however, that these nations lack the
legal institutions and laws to deal with these claims. But in some
nations there is a lack of will to overcome institutionalized stagna-
tion. When Latin American nations cling to tradition and claim
changes would be an "Americanization" of their legal systems, one
needs only to point to the complete revision of civil procedure in
Spain in 2000.112 As most Latin American nations trace their legal
roots to Spanish law, and continue to have deep respect for the
Spanish legal tradition, it would seem that some modern day trac-
ing would help to create within Latin America a procedural reform
180. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 336 (Angela Partington ed.,
Oxford University Press 1994) ("The report of my death was an exaggeration"
(quoting NEW YORK JOURNAL, June 2, 1897)).
181. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kalvin, 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(addressing Bolivia); HSBC USA, Inc. v. Prosegur Para., S.A., 2004 WL 2210283
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (addressing Paraguay); Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 250 F. Supp. 2d
156 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (addressing Russia); Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134
(2d Cir. 2000) (addressing Liberia). But see Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venez., 997
F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1993) (addressing Venezuela); Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 981
F.2d 1345 (1st Cir. 1992) (addressing Turkey); Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965 F.
Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (addressing Peru); Banco Mercantile, S.A. v. Hernandez
Arencibia, 927 F. Supp. 565 (D.P.R. 1996) (addressing the Dominican Republic).
182. See Nadal, supra note 36.
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that would reduce the differences that are often debated in forum
non conveniens arguments and upon which Dahl places so much
emphasis.
Dahl follows his discussion of evidentiary issues with a list of
additional characteristics of Latin American legal systems that
favor bringing a plaintiffs suit in the United States.183 They
include problems with service of process, filing fees, application of
the rule that loser pays all costs, congested dockets, the impossi-
bility to implead third parties, and difficulty in finding an attor-
ney who will or may work on a contingent fee basis.18" ' These
distinctions are often discussed in U.S. cases, but with deference
to the U.S. Supreme Court Gilbert decision's reservation that dif-
ferences in characteristics of legal systems, even significant differ-
ences in available damages, do not justify a ruling that the foreign
system is not an adequate system. 8 ' Dahl, with support from
many plaintiffs as well as their counsel and experts, apparently
feels otherwise. The answer lies in a change in U.S. law nullifying
current Supreme Court precedent, which will not be the solution,
or in amendments to the many characteristics of Latin American
legal procedures that Dahl helpfully outlines. It does not seem to
lie in attempting to force upon U.S. courts many cases where the
actions complained of took place in distant foreign nations.
V. PARLATINO MOVEMENT: A CALL TO THE NORTH
YET UNHEARD
While Dahl sees no actual need for the foreign forum shop-
ping support statutes,' 86 he has been fully committed to the enact-
ment of such laws in Latin America, especially through the efforts
of an organization called Parlatino.8 7 Little known in the United
States, Parlatino is an acronym for Latin American Parliament.1 88
It is not a law-making parliament, but an organization of some
members of some Latin American legislatures.189 It is clearly a
group of legislators committed to assisting their nationals in
183. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 40-42.
184. See id.
185. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) ("[Tjhe plaintiffs choice
of forum should rarely be disturbed.").
186. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 42-43.
187. The most common reference to Parlatino is a website of the InterAmerican Bar
Association which Dahl maintains. See www.iaba.org/LLinks-forumnon_
Parlatino.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).




responding to the frequent forum non conveniens dismissals in
U.S. courts. The organization seems to have been a reaction to the
final dismissal in the long-running Delgado case.190 Soon after the
lower court decision in Delgado, Parlatino challenged forum non
conveniens by drafting a brief Model Law on International Juris-
diction and Applicable Law to Tort Liability in 1998.91 The Model
Law was approved by Parlatino's Permanent Forum of Regional
Parliaments for the Environment and for a Sustainable Develop-
ment on January 27, 1998.192 The law reads:
Art. 1. National and international jurisdiction. The peti-
tion that is validly filed, according to both legal systems, in
the defendant's domiciliary court, extinguishes national
jurisdiction. The latter is only reborn if the plaintiff non-
suits of his foreign petition and files a new petition in the
country, in a completely free and spontaneous way.
Art. 2. International tort liability. Damages. In cases of
international tort liability, the national court may, at the
plaintiffs request, apply to damages and to the pecuniary
sanctions related to such damages, the relevant standards
and amounts of the pertinent foreign law.'93
The model law was intended to clarify "certain rules on interna-
tional jurisdiction."94 In so far as it purported to create new rules
between members of Parlatino, these rules would have to be
enacted by each member legislature. Indeed, several legislatures
of Parlatino members' nations have enacted laws based upon or
drawing from the Parlatino Model Law.' 95 The United States is
not a member of Parlatino. The proposed provisions have no rele-
vance to U.S. courts' jurisdiction, including motions to dismiss for
any reason recognized in the United States. Furthermore, the
comments by Parlatino are confusing in that they attempt to give
190. See Delgado Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995), affd, 231
F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000).
191. See DAHL, DAHL'S LAW DICTIONARY at 239.
192. See id. This Forum is an aspirational group; it has no legislative authority.
See Dahl, supra note 5, at 47 ("The model legislation [Parlatinol enacts . . .carries
only persuasive weight."). But since it expresses an interest held by a number of
legislators in several Latin American nations, international lawyers ought to be
familiar with its positions and the possible impact it has on national legislatures and
courts.
193. DAHL, DAHL's LAW DICTIONARY at 240.
194. Id. at 239. Those rules were not identified. There is indeed no truly
international set of rules on jurisdiction. The real attempt of Parlatino appears to
have been to create a rule among the members of Parlatino that would become
accepted as a rule of international jurisdiction extending far beyond Parlatino.
195. See id. at 218-239.
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the plaintiffs choice of forum greater weight than the laws of that
chosen foreign forum. They seek to "strengthen[]" the choice
made by the plaintiff.'96 Parlatino suggests that its proposed law
would, in Article 1, allow a plaintiff to choose a foreign forum that
meets the norms of the Bustamante Code and that the foreign
"judge will not be able to close the doors of the [foreign] court on
him as, for instance, has been happening with the theory of forum
non conveniens."117 Since none of the Parlatino nations recognizes
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 9 8 the reference to foreclo-
sure can only refer to the United States, or other foreign courts
recognizing that theory. But it is not the parliaments of other
nations that open or close the doors to the U.S. courts. That U.S.
judges alone have discretion to decide forum non con-
veniens-based motions to dismiss is undeniably correct. 9 9 They
may dismiss cases for many other reasons such as failure to state
a cause of action or absence of subject matter jurisdiction. This
represents a discretionary authority that most civil law system
judges do not fully share. But failure to possess an authority to
dismiss a case under one nation's legal procedure is not reason to
impose that view on another nation.
Parlatino has been careful not to extinguish fully home-
nation jurisdiction of a plaintiff when it first files abroad. 200 There
is little doubt that such extinguishment could occur through legis-
lation and/or constitutional reform in each of the Parlatino mem-
ber nations. But the Parlatino proposal does not remove
jurisdiction absolutely; each plaintiff is presented with an escape
valve. The model law allows one of its beneficiaries who has been
dismissed abroad, presumably for any reason, whether it be lack
of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, statute of limitations or
forum non conveniens, to file an action in the home court, as long
as he does so in a "completely free and spontaneous way."20 ' If a
suit has been dismissed from a U.S. court under forum non con-
veniens, the foreign plaintiff is "completely free" to decide what to
196. Dahl, supra note 5, at 47. Dahl does not discuss the Parlatino efforts in detail,
but he includes an appendix of valuable information from the Inter-American Bar
Association website. Id.
197. Id.
198. The doctrine is not recognized throughout the civil law tradition world. See
supra text accompanying note 99. The Parlatino nations carry this further in their
attempt to actually nullify forum non conveniens.
199. This is assumed to be a more refined way of referring to opening or closing
doors to the court.
200. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 47.
201. DAHL, DAHL's LAW DICTIoNARYat 240.
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do next.0 2 Dahl believes this foreign plaintiff is coerced and com-
pelled to file at home. °3 In actuality, the plaintiff may propose
settlement negotiations with the other parties who were the
defendants in the dismissed suits, appeal the dismissal to a
higher state or federal court in the United States, file a suit in any
other country, including but not necessarily his own, or do abso-
lutely nothing.0 4 The plaintiff is also entitled to return to the
United States in the event his own forum proves to be unavaila-
ble.205 But the Model Act does not make it unavailable.2 ' If it did,
the issue would have been raised in the original filing during the
forum non conveniens discussion. That presumably will be the
case in the future.2 7 One wonders how Dahl would view a U.S.
court that, upon dismissing an action on forum non conveniens
grounds, hypothetically stated:
This ruling only dismisses this action. It does not compel,
order or suggest any future action by the plaintiff. Any fur-
ther suit filed by the foreign plaintiff at home or in any
other jurisdiction, any settlement action, or any agreement
to arbitrate is considered by this court to be done in a 'com-
pletely free and spontaneous way.'
Dahl ends his article with the suggestion that these laws do
not really change the existing law, but only clarify long standing
202. Id.
203. Dahl, supra note 5, at 25.
204. The dismissed suit in Delgado led to much of the response by Parlatino and
several Latin American nations (especially Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama) whose nationals were parties to suit. See
Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995). An important defendant
was Dead Sea Bromine, Ltd., an Israeli company. See id. at 1336. The plaintiffs
dismissed in the U.S. court could have filed in Israel. Could it be that the absence of
contingent fees, civil jury trials and punitive damages in Israel led them not to pursue
that option? It was, after all, the domicile of the defendant.
205. The court in Delgado stated that if the highest court of any of the plaintiffs'
nations affirmed dismissal of the case after it was filed in the home nation, the
plaintiff could return to the U.S. court and request the resumption of jurisdiction.
Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1357. It is not clear whether that meant to include the
circumstances arising from the approach taken by Parlatino in selectively
terminating jurisdiction.
206. The Model Act has no binding authority. See supra text accompanying note
192.
207. The Venezuela counterpart to Parlatino was raised directly in some of the
Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone cases, both in Indiana and Texas federal courts. In re
Bridgetsone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (S.D. Ind.
2002); Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D. Tex. 2004). For reasons
beyond the scope of this article, the contrasting decisions in those cases are not
discussed.
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law based on the Bustamante Code. 0 I believe the experience of
the several nations that have adopted laws with Parlatino Model
Law characteristics belie this supposition. U.S. courts have strug-
gled at times with the meaning of these laws. That is largely
because the subject foreign nation's laws of jurisdiction have
always provided for alternative forms of jurisdiction. All of these
nations provide for jurisdiction over a tort where the tortious act
occurred, in addition to a provision for jurisdiction in the domicile
of the defendant. Thus there has always been a choice of jurisdic-
tion for the plaintiff. But before Parlatino, foreign plaintiffs were
arguing that these traditional laws of jurisdiction accomplished
the same goal that Parlatino would seek more aggressively."9
Essentially they claimed that the plaintiffs choice to file in the
location of the foreign defendant carried with it a mandate to that
foreign court to both accept jurisdiction and proceed to trial.210
Courts were obviously suspicious of such arguments. In one of the
early dibromochlorpropane (DBCP) pesticide cases, Patrickson v.
Dole Food Company, the Hawaiian federal district court dismissed
cases after considering claims that the laws of Costa Rica, Ecua-
dor, Guatemala and Panama, terminated jurisdiction in those
countries when a case arising from the same facts was initiated in
the United States.211 The Patrickson decision was not kind to the
plaintiffs arguments and found the foreign courts in each case to
be available.212 213 The Parlatino Model Law was completed in Jan-
208. Dahl, supra note 5, at 43.
209. See, e.g., Delgado, 890 F. Supp. 1324.
210. See id. (especially pertaining to the testimony of the experts on the applicable
foreign law).
211. See Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., Civil Action No. 97-01516 (D.Haw. 1998).
212. Neither Dahl nor Garro find the case helpful to their theories. Indeed, Garro's
expert testimony that the laws of each of the four nations rejected jurisdiction was
unconvincing to the court, which found that each nation was an available forum. See
Patrickson at 34-43. Garro's arguments are essentially the same as he presented in
his article following Dahl in the symposium. See Garro, supra note 6, at 77.
213. On appeal, the Circuit Court included some language applicable to the federal
question issue, but of interest to the public policy question of forum shopping. The
court stated, "[w]e are particularly troubled by the suggestion that . . . federal
jurisdiction will hinge on whether a foreign government has taken a position in
support or opposition to the litigation.... Inviting foreign governments to tell us how
litigation in our courts affects their interests can only put us in the awkward position
of causing an affront to those governments if their interests are not respected. We
consider it far more prudent to state clearly that the effect of the litigation on the
economies of foreign countries is of absolutely no consequence to our jurisdiction."
The case was reversed and remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction before the




uary 1998, a few months before the Patrickson decision.214
Guatemalan law was quite unlike the Model Law, but specifi-
cally attempted to nullify forum non conveniens by declaring it to
be "unacceptable and invalid" in Article 1 of the Guatemalan Law
for the Defense of Procedural Rights of Nationals and Residents.215
But Article 3 gave judges authority to resume jurisdiction after a
forum non conveniens dismissal "to avoid procedural abandon-
ment of the Guatemalan nationals and residents."216 Ecuador had
also addressed the issue by enacting Law 55.217 Dahl referred to
Guatemalan and Ecuadorian law in his article as the examples of
laws that did not change previous law.21s But even though they
attempted to nullify forum non conveniens, they were rejected by
the Hawaiian federal district court in Patrickson as justification to
retain the cases.21s The court had less trouble with the laws of
Panama and Costa Rica, which had no such forum non conveniens
220provisions.
Knowledge of the history of the movement to adopt methods
to nullify forum non conveniens has made a difference in U.S.
courts. Courts have often been poorly informed by defendants'
experts, especially when those experts have few qualifications in
private international law and civil law systems. That proved true
in both the Blanco case, on which Dahl places great emphasis, and
the 2002 decision involving Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone in
consolidated cases in Indiana that arose from accidents in Vene-
zuela and Colombia. 221 Two years later, a Texas federal court
addressing some of the Ford cases occurring in Venezuela that
214. See DAHL, DAHL'S LAW DICTIONARY at 239.
215. Dahl includes the law in his Appendix. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 48.
216. Id.
217. Ecuadorian Law 55 was held to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Tribunal, Caso. Nro. 037-2001-TC May 2, 2002, Registro Oficial 572, May 9, 2002.
Article 3(a), requiring a bond in the amount of the amount demanded by the plaintiff,
plus fees and expenses, for the foreign defendant to defend the suit in Guatemala, of
Guatemala's foreign forum shopping support law, the Law for the Defense of
Procedural Rights of Nationals and Residents was declared unconstitutional by the
appellate courts. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 48.
218. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 43.
219. See Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., Civil Action No. 97-01516, 39-44 (D. Haw.
1998).
220. See id. at 35-39.
221. Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venez., 997 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1993); see also In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
This author was a consultant and expert for Bridgetown/Firestone in cases involving
accidents in Venezuela and Mexico brought in courts in Chicago, Houston, Miami and
Nashville. Upon consolidation of the cases in Indiana, he was no longer involved
because the consolidated cases lawyers had already obtained their own experts.
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had not been consolidated, rejected the Indiana court's analysis of
forum non conveniens and dismissed the cases.222 The Texas court
found the Venezuelan courts capable of asserting jurisdiction but
the Plaintiffs unwilling to do so.223 That is a distinction that may
prove to be the cross to the vampire.
VI. THE CHALLENGE FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION COURT
Dahl overstates the issue when he concludes that "[t]he issue
of [forum non conveniens] is probably the thorniest one dividing
the Civil and the Common Law legal systems."224 But the division
between those systems in Latin America and forum non con-
veniens in the United States differs significantly from the division
between civil law systems in Europe and forum non conveniens in
the United Kingdom.22' The latter revolves around the E.C. Regu-
lation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 226 The European
Court of Justice in Owusu v. Jackson in 2005 held that the U.K.
could no longer apply forum non conveniens because it was incon-
sistent with U.K. obligations under the Brussels Regulation. 27
The court believed the doctrine to be too unpredictable.228 There is
no such argument to be made with regard to the Latin American
nations and the United States. There is no comparable treaty law
on which to base such a decision, not the PFNC treaties and cer-
tainly not the OAS Proposals or UN General Assembly Resolu-
tions. There may someday be an international convention on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments, but negotiations to
that end have lasted more than a decade and achieved only a very
modest Convention on Choice of Courts that would not resolve the
tort issues of the kind facing the U.S. courts in the cases brought
by Latin Americans.229
While the future is difficult to predict, as I suspect Dahl
would agree, we undoubtedly follow different paths leading to
where we believe the law will evolve. Dahl thinks U.S. courts will
respond positively to the enactment of the kind of law Parlatino
222. See Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672, 682-83, 689 (S.D. Tex.
2004).
223. See id. at 689.
224. Dahl, supra note 5, at 45.
225. See COLLIER, supra note 2, at 78.
226. See Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. 1-1383.
227. See Owusu.
228. See id. 41.
229. See Hague Convention, supra note 98.
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has promoted. ° In contrast, I believe that when U.S. courts are
aware of the motivation behind these forum shopping support
laws, and especially the escape routes that make these laws selec-
tive depending upon the motivations of the foreign plaintiffs,
forum non conveniens will continue to be the basis to dismiss most
of these actions. Of course there could be legislation enacted to
address these issues. Drawing from the efforts of Parlatino it
might state that forum shopping in U.S. courts by foreigners is a
threat to the overburdened capacity of U.S. courts to render fair
process to parties who have not forum shopped. In such a case the
U.S. court would not dismiss the action on forum non conveniens
grounds; the court would simply not have subject matter jurisdic-
tion to hear the matter. The court would make one inquiry: is the
plaintiffs claim one which, assuming the principal defendants are
domestic, gives rise to a cause of action that is recognized in the
majority of nations with legal systems that provide due process?
How many foreign plaintiffs would then insist that their govern-
ments develop viable judicial systems to deal with these cases?
Such U.S. legislation is unlikely to be adopted, however. The
more predictable response to the concept of the Parlatino move-
ment is that courts will raise the level or alter the focus of inquiry
to why the foreign plaintiff is forum shopping in the United
States. Courts have already begun both to make strong state-
ments about excessive forum shopping and its impacts. 2 1 Courts
have also begun to distinguish situations where the foreign forum
is unavailable because the nation has adopted a selective and dis-
criminatory availability standard232 and situations where the
defendant is simply not "amenable to process," as the availability
test was first stated in Piper.233
Dahl's article helps to place these issues squarely before us,
and I sense that when courts are properly briefed on the back-
ground and motivation of these laws the courts will be more
inclined to reject the forum shopping motive of these foreign plain-
230. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 43-44.
231. See, e.g., Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., No. 97-01516 (D. Haw. 1998); Republic of
Bol. v. Philip Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
232. See, e.g., Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D. Tex. 2004);
Chandler v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Co., 163 S.W. 3d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); In re
Ecuadorian Shrimp Litig., 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 767a (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999); Ciba-
Geigy Ltd. BASF A.G. v. Fish Peddler, Inc., 691 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
233. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 n.22 (1981). The language in Piper
states that the amenability to process test is subject to an exception when "the
remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory." Lacking pain and
suffering or punitive damages is not considered "clearly unsatisfactory." Id.
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tiffs seeking legal asylum from their nations' laws than to accept
the application of interpretations of the Bustamante Code as
applicable in U.S. courts. Bustamante's efforts did not make it
across the U.S. border, indeed they did not make it to the bor-
der. 34 Mexico rejected the Code and thus left the dividing line at
the border between Guatemala and Mexico.235 I return to the com-
ments of the Texas federal district court in Republic of Bolivia v.
Philip Morris Companies, Inc.:
[T]his humble Court by the sea is certainly flattered by
what must be the worldwide renown of rural Texas courts
for dispensing justice with unparalleled fairness and alac-
rity, apparently in common discussion even on the moun-
tain peaks of Bolivia! Still, the Court would be remiss in
accepting an obligation for which it truly does not have the
necessary resources.236
With the greatest reluctance, the U.S. may be inclined to give up
its reputation as the world's best place to forum shop. Lord Den-
ning's flame is out-the moths should use their night radar to fly
home.
234. See Republic of Bol., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008.
235. See Bustamante Code, supra note 52. Mexico made no formal declaration, but
did not become a signatory.
236. Republic of Bol., 39 F. Supp. at 1009.
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